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I. INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF HISTORY
An aggrieved buyer that fails to give its seller timely notification of
breach, or that gives a timely but insufficient notification, suffers serious
and sometimes catastrophic consequences under Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or Code). On the serious end, a buyer
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entitled to reject must provide its seller with a timely notification1 that
makes it clear that the goods again belong to the seller,2 with failure as
to either timeliness or sufficiency resulting in acceptance rather than
rejection.3 Obvious policy rationales support both requirements. The
timeliness requirement creates an incentive for a buyer to exercise its
inspection rights quickly. 4 Prompt detection and reporting of a
nonconformity is desirable because a cure can be effectuated more
quickly, thereby mitigating the harm to both parties. If there is no cure,
the seller can maximize the goods’ resale value by recovering them
quickly and, as nearly as practicable, in the same condition as when they
were tendered. Regarding sufficiency, if a notification merely states that
there is a problem, the seller could legitimately assume that the buyer
intends to accept the goods and that the purpose of the notification is to
preserve its right to recover monetary damages. This level of information
will not suffice for a rejection:5 The seller must be made aware that the
buyer does not intend to keep the goods so that it can exercise its cure
rights or recover the goods. A revocation of acceptance also requires a
timely notification that advises the seller that the seller owns the goods,6
and the underlying policies are the same as in cases of rejection.7
Although the consequences of an untimely or insufficient notification
provided in connection with an attempted rejection or revocation of

1. U.C.C. § 2-602(1) (2002). Except as otherwise stated, all references to Article
2 are to the 2002 Official Text, the version in effect immediately prior to the promulgation of
the 2003 amendments. References to amended Article 2 are to the 2003 Official Text.
2. Id. § 2-401(4) (providing that rejection, whether rightful or wrongful, revests
title in seller).
3. Id. § 2-606(1)(b) (providing that acceptance occurs upon buyer’s failure to
make effective rejection).
4. See id. § 2-602(1) cmt. 1.
5. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Acme Ref. Co., 513 F. Supp. 2d 906, 911 (E.D.
Mich. 2007) (holding that an e-mail requesting a price adjustment is insufficient for
effective rejection); Midwest Generation, LLC v. Carbon Processing & Reclamation,
445 F. Supp. 2d 928, 933–34 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (holding that complaining about the quality
of goods is insufficient for effective rejection).
6. U.C.C. § 2-401(4) (2002) (providing that justifiable revocation of acceptance
revests title in seller).
7. The requirement that notification be given within a reasonable time after the
buyer discovers, or should have discovered, the breach limits the extent to which the
buyer may continue to use the goods and the extent to which the goods depreciate in
value before the seller recovers them. Regarding sufficiency, the seller must be advised
that the buyer will not be keeping the goods so that it can take steps to recover them. Id.
§ 2-608 cmt. 5 (“More will generally be necessary than the mere notification of breach
required under [UCC § 2-607(3)(a)].”). The cure rationale underlying the sufficiency
requirement in cases of rejection does not apply, except for the few instances in which
courts have read into the Code a postrevocation right of cure. See, e.g., Phoenix Color
Corp. v. Krause Am., Inc., 25 F. App’x 133, 138–39 (4th Cir. 2001) (implying that a
seller is entitled to cure following revocation).
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acceptance are serious,8 a buyer’s failure to notify properly does not,
with one exception applicable only to rejection,9 leave it without
recourse because it generally is entitled to a monetary-damages remedy
available under section 2-714.10 Even this remedy, however, may be lost
by a failure to give a timely and sufficient notification. Section 2-607(3)(a)
provides that “the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers
or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be
barred from any remedy.”11 This rule is a nuclear bomb that, if triggered,
eradicates all remedies. One would anticipate that such a catastrophic
result must be grounded in appropriate policies but, as we shall see,
many of the rationales that have been advanced to support it are
thoroughly unconvincing. Note at the outset that the policies underlying
the notification requirements in cases of rejection and revocation of
acceptance do not apply in this context because the buyer rather than the
seller owns the goods and the seller does not have statutory cure rights.
Professor Richard Speidel, to whose memory this tribute issue is
dedicated, sought through the Article 2 revision process to ameliorate
the harsh effects of section 2-607(3)(a). After he resigned as Reporter in
1999 and the scope of the project was scaled back,12 the solution he
8. As noted in the text accompanying note 3, a buyer’s failure to effectively reject
results in acceptance, and one of the consequences of acceptance is that the buyer must
pay for the goods at the contract rate. U.C.C. §§ 2-607(1), 2-709(1)(a) (2002). Effective
rejection or revocation of acceptance excuses the buyer from this payment obligation and
the buyer, in addition, may recover any part of the price that has been paid. Id. § 2-711(1).
9. A buyer’s failure to identify in its notification of rejection a particular defect
that a reasonable inspection would have disclosed precludes it from relying on the defect
for any remedial purpose if the seller could have cured the defect. Id. § 2-605(1). The
same result applies for a comparable omission if both parties are merchants and after rejection
the seller makes a written request for a full and complete statement of all the defects
upon which the buyer intends to rely. Id. § 2-605(1)(b). Although harsh, the rationale
for the rule is clear: It creates an incentive for a buyer receiving goods to inspect them
thoroughly and to get all the problems out in the open quickly so they can be dealt with
by cure or otherwise. Under amended Article 2, the effect of a failure to particularize is
limited to loss of the right to rely on an unstated defect to justify rejection. Id. § 2-605(1)
(amended 2003).
10. Id. § 2-607(2) (2002) (providing that, with an exception relating only to attempts to
revoke acceptance notwithstanding knowledge of a nonconformity, acceptance does not of
itself impair any other remedy for nonconformity).
11. Id. § 2-607(3)(a) (emphasis added). The requirement is reinforced in section
2-714(1), which conditions damages on compliance with the notification requirement.
12. Professor Speidel and Associate Reporter Linda Rusch resigned from the revision
process in 1999 and the work continued, with a reduced charge, under a reconstituted drafting
committee. The unfortunate events leading to the resignations are described in William
H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 47 DUQ. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2009).
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drafted retained the support of the reconstituted drafting committee and
was included among the amendments promulgated by the Code’s
sponsors in 2003. His solution captures the essence of the need for
postacceptance notification and articulates a viable standard to satisfy
that need.
Professor Speidel served as Project Director for the Study Group on
Article 2 commissioned in 1987 by the Permanent Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code (PEB). With regard to notification, the
Study Group’s report stated that section 2-607(3)(a) “operates on the
assumption that notice is important to effect a cure, or to facilitate an
effort to negotiate a settlement, or to gather and preserve evidence for
possible litigation. All of these are laudable purposes.”13 However, the
report noted two problems: Some courts had injected too much
formalism, as by requiring that a notification specify that a claimed
problem constitutes a breach; and by requiring notification of a breach
that should have, but had not, been discovered, the provision could
deprive a buyer of all remedies even though it lacked actual knowledge
of the breach.14 The report concluded as follows:
Literal interpretations of the notice requirement should be rejected. Either the
text of § 2-607(3)(a) or the comments should be revised to require only that the
notice inform the seller that problems have arisen or continue to exist with
regard to the accepted goods. Also, the comments should clarify that the buyer
has no obligation to notify for breaches of which it has no knowledge.15

The last draft of revised Article 2 authored by Professor Speidel
retained the original rule that conditions remedies on notification within
a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered
the breach, but it added the following sentence: “However, a failure to
give timely notice bars the person required to notify the party claimed
against from a remedy only to the extent that the party entitled to notice
establishes that it was prejudiced by the failure.”16 The comments
explained the effect of the sentence as follows:
The focus of requiring notice is to avoid bad faith assertions of breach, not to
deprive a person acting in good faith of a remedy. In line with that philosophy,
if the notice is untimely, the person who failed to give timely notice is not barred
from obtaining a remedy for breach unless the party claimed against demonstrates

13. PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2: PRELIMINARY
REPORT 167 (1990). These and other policy rationales that have been advanced by courts and
commentators are discussed infra Part II.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 168–69. A change in the comments could not have resolved the latter
problem because the text of the Code requires notification of a breach that the buyer should
have discovered.
16. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE REVISED ARTICLE 2. SALES § 2-707(C)(1) (Proposed Final Draft 1999).
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the failure to timely notify resulted in prejudice to that party. For example, prejudice
could be demonstrated if the delay in giving notice prevented the party claimed
against from collecting evidence relevant to the breach. The party who is alleged to
have breached the contract or warranty is ultimately protected from stale claims by
the statute of limitations.17

The amendments to Article 2 that were finally promulgated in 2003
retain Professor Speidel’s prejudice rule but unfortunately fail to retain
the quoted language from his comments. Instead, the comments to the
amendments explain the prejudice rule as follows:
A failure to give this notice to the seller bars the buyer from a remedy for breach of
contract if the seller suffers prejudice due to the failure to notify. See Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 229, which provides for an excuse of a condition where
the failure is not material and implementation would result in a disproportionate
forfeiture.18

The premise of this Article is that the approach drafted by Professor
Speidel as informed by both of the quoted comments is far superior to
the original approach. The denial of any remedy to an aggrieved party
because it stumbles with respect to some aspect of a notification is
draconian, and section 2-607(3)(a) should not be retained in its present
form. It is easy to see why Professor Speidel, who championed fairness
in the substance and application of the law, was troubled with the
provision.
Drafters, of course, must concern themselves with certainty as well as
fairness, and these values are often in tension. The enhanced fairness of
amended section 2-607(3)(a) is readily apparent; less apparent is that it
also will result in greater predictability. This Article demonstrates how
the focus on prejudice to the seller facilitates an appropriate analyses of
the timeliness and sufficiency of a notification. The use of a flexible
standard that denies remedies only to the extent of seller prejudice
addresses the actual impact on the seller, as distinct from the hypothetical
impacts considered important by so many courts.
Although the effort to modernize Article 2 has failed thus far in the
state legislatures, most of what amended section 2-607(3)(a) would
accomplish can be achieved in the courts. The courts, unfortunately,
cannot go quite as far as the amended provision because the absence of
the words “to the extent” in the original provision means that a notification
failure must continue to result in the loss of all remedies. However, the
17.
18.

Id. § 2-707 cmt. 5.
U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (2004).
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original provision’s requirement that notification be given within a
reasonable time and its silence as to the required contents give the courts
a great deal of discretion, and they can do much to ameliorate its harsh
effects by using only the prejudicial impact of any delay or lack of
sufficiency as the basis for determining whether proper notification has
been given. Under our suggested approach, a buyer would lose all remedial
rights only if its notification failure significantly prejudiced an important
interest of the seller. There is nothing novel here—many courts have
stressed the prejudicial effect of a delay or lack of sufficiency in support
of their conclusions19—but we would go even further than some of these
courts and require that a seller establish significant prejudice to an
important interest before a buyer is deprived of its remedies. Keeping a
tight focus on prejudice is consistent with the language of the existing
statute, consistent with the original comments properly understood,
consistent with the work of Professor Speidel in seeking to revise the
statute and comments, and consistent with the antiforfeiture approach of
section 229 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
II. POLICIES PURPORTEDLY UNDERLYING THE
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
As noted above, proper application of section 2-607(3)(a) requires an
assessment of the timeliness of the notification and the sufficiency of its
contents. This assessment has been driven by multiple policies that
purportedly underlie the notification requirement. The reliance by the
courts on different policies to undergird their analysis has led to
inconsistent results, creating a level of uncertainty that is intolerable in
an area where the stakes are so high.20 Some of the policies—investigation,
settlement, and good faith—are compelling, but merely articulating one
of these policies does not provide sufficient insight to permit a proper

19. See, e.g., Cole v. Keller Indus., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1470, 1473 (E.D. Va. 1994),
vacated, 132 F.3d 1044 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding disagreement between trial and appellate
courts on the prejudicial impact of destructive testing by the plaintiff); Fitl v. Strek, 690
N.W.2d 605, 609 (Neb. 2005) (rejecting seller’s argument that buyer’s delay in giving
notification prejudiced seller’s ability to cure); Wilson v. Tuxen, 754 N.W.2d 220, 233
(Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a ten-month delay in reporting diseased cattle prejudiced
seller’s ability to replace cattle and thereby mitigate harm).
20. “With no clear and consistent set of policies to guide their discretion, the
courts have reached inconsistent results on what a ‘reasonable time’ is.” John C. Reitz,
Against Notice: A Proposal to Restrict the Notice of Claims Rule in U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a),
73 CORNELL L. REV. 534, 543 (1988) (analyzing carefully each of the rationales that
purportedly underlie the notification requirement). “The most vexatious and frequently
litigated 2-607(3)(a) question is: what constitutes a ‘reasonable time’ within which the
buyer ‘should have discovered any breach’ and have notified the seller?” JAMES J. WHITE
& ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 418 (5th ed. 2000).
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assessment of the timeliness of a notification or the sufficiency of its
contents. The remaining policies—cure, mitigation, and staleness—are
either not compelling or are subsumed under one or more of the
compelling policies. The discussion here explains the policies and
demonstrates how a prejudice-based approach will produce results that
are both fairer and more predictable.
A. Compelling Policies
1. Investigation
Perhaps the most compelling policy rationale advanced in support of
section 2-607(3)(a) is that notification alerts the seller to the fact that it
might need to conduct an investigation.21 If, as is usually the case, the
problem relates to the quality of the goods rather than to the adequacy of
the tender, the seller might want to examine the goods, test them, review
its records concerning the transaction, interview witnesses, preserve
evidence, and otherwise acquire the information it needs to formulate an
appropriate response. After investigating, the seller might decide to increase
testing on its remaining inventory, take corrective measures with respect
to units still being produced, assert a claim against a third party, warn
the buyer about further potential risks, seek a settlement with the buyer
through offers to correct the problem or to provide compensation, take some
other action, or adopt a combination of measures. If the seller concludes
that the alleged problem does not exist or that the problem is not its
responsibility, the investigation will prove helpful if it has to prepare for

21. See Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 152 (6th Cir. 1983)
(stating that notification minimizes the possibility of prejudice to a seller); E. Air Lines
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 972 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that notification
allows a seller to investigate “while the facts are fresh”); see also WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 20; Barkley Clark, The First Line of Defense in Warranty Suits: Failure to
Give Notice of Breach, 15 UCC L.J. 105, 110–11 (1982); Debra L. Goetz et al., Special
Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 1159, 1318, 1323 (1987); Jerry J. Phillips, Notice of Breach in Sales and Strict
Tort Liability Law: Should There Be a Difference?, 47 IND. L.J. 457, 466–68 (1972);
Harry G. Prince, Overprotecting the Consumer? Section 2-607(3)(a) Notice of Breach in
Nonprivity Contexts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 107, 116 (1987); Marvin Chavis, Note, Notice of
Breach and the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 520, 522 (1973); George
Frank Hammond, Note, Notification of Breach Under Uniform Commercial Code
Section 2-607(3)(A): A Conflict, A Resolution, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 525, 541 (1985);
Patrick A. Milberger, Note, Section 2-607(3)(a): Effective Notification of Breach Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 733, 737 (1983).
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litigation. The notification requirement should be applied in a way that
protects the seller’s legitimate interest in conducting an investigation.
Some courts have imposed forfeitures on buyers without considering
the effect of the notification failure on the seller’s investigation interest.
For example, the court in EPN-Delaval, S.A. v. Inter-Equip, Inc.22 barred
the buyer’s claim for damages because of what the court considered to
be an untimely notification when the seller had delivered huge steel
heads cast in the wrong shape. Because the shape could not have been
changed after delivery, it is difficult to see how the delay could have
adversely affected the seller’s investigation interest. This observation
does not mean that there might not have been prejudice—the delay
might have caused the seller to lose a potential claim against a third
party—but on the facts as stated, the result seems excessively harsh. In
contrast, the trial and appellate courts in Cole v. Keller Industries, Inc.
focused on the seller’s investigation interest.23 The plaintiff in Cole
waited nearly four months to notify the seller about an allegedly
defective third step on a ladder, but by that time the plaintiff’s testing
had destroyed part of the ladder and some of the critical rivets had been
lost. Without a prejudicial effect caused by the plaintiff’s testing or some
other factor, an even longer delay should not have led to a forfeiture of
the plaintiff’s remedies. 24
In some circumstances a buyer will have to notify its seller more than
once in order to protect the seller’s investigation interest. For example, a
buyer’s notification might lead the parties to agree that the seller should
attempt a cure. If the buyer subsequently decides that the cure did not
adequately resolve the problem, it should provide another notification so
that the seller can initiate a further investigation and formulate an
additional response. Standard Alliance Industries, Inc. v. Black Clawson
Co.25 is illustrative. The buyer initially notified the seller that the goods
did not satisfy a performance warranty and the seller spent five months
working on corrections. Although the parties disputed whether, at the
end of its efforts, the seller knew that it had been unsuccessful, the court

22. 542 F. Supp. 238 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
23. 872 F. Supp. 1470 (E.D. Va. 1994), vacated, 132 F.3d 1044 (4th Cir. 1998).
24. The appellate court vacated the district court’s holding. Id. The plaintiff was
an employee of the buyer and the appellate court held that a nonbuyer suffering personal
injuries is not required to give a notification. With respect to the spoliation, the court indicated
that the seller’s experts had not been prejudiced in their ability to reach conclusions
concerning the cause of the accident because they had sufficiently inspected and tested
the ladder prior to the testing by the plaintiff.
25. 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978).
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concluded that the buyer had impaired the seller’s subsequent investigation
interest by not notifying it that the problems had continued.26
The potential connection between a buyer’s notification and a seller’s
preparation for litigation has led to two distinct tests for sufficiency.
The comments foster the division because courts and commentators
favoring each test have been able to seize upon one of two sentences as
support for their position. The lenient test is premised on the statement
that “[t]he content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the
seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be
watched.”27 For example, the court in Olsen v. BBRG Massachusetts
Restaurant, Inc.28 held that filling out an accident report at the restaurant
after the customer fractured two teeth while biting down on a foreign
object in a french fry constituted sufficient notification of a breach-ofwarranty claim. Comparably, the buyers provided adequate notification
of their breach-of-warranty claims in Munch v. Sears Roebuck & Co.29
when they complained to the seller that they were having problems with
the goods and requested that it repair them.
The strict test focuses on the statement in the comments that “[t]he
notification which preserves the buyer’s rights under this Article need
only be such as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to
involve a breach.”30 For example, in K & M Joint Venture v. Smith
International, Inc.31 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court’s determination that the buyer had given adequate
notification, thereby overturning an award of three million dollars in
damages. The buyer had notified the seller repeatedly about malfunctions in
the machine, the seller’s representative had inspected the machine at the
job site, and the buyer had informed the seller that it would charge back
the cost of repairs. However, the appellate court barred the buyer from
26. See also Indus. Fiberglass v. Jandt, 361 N.W.2d 595, 599 (N.D. 1985) (involving a
buyer who was denied a remedy because there was no notification concerning any defects
other than the ones the seller corrected).
27. U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (2002); see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 421–22;
Clark, supra note 21, at 119–23; Hammond, supra note 21, at 530 n.32 (listing multiple
case citations).
28. 2005 Mass. App. Div. 23 (Dist. Ct. 2005).
29. 2007 WL 2461660 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2007).
30. U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (2002); see E. Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
532 F.2d 957, 976 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting the lenient standard and insisting that
notification is required to indicate that the transaction is “claimed to involve a breach”);
Hammond, supra note 21, at 534 n.51 (listing multiple case citations).
31. 669 F.2d 1106 (6th Cir. 1982).
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any remedy because it never explicitly stated that it considered the seller
to be in breach.
Proponents of the strict test apply reasoning that is far too legalistic.32
Most buyers are not trained lawyers and should not be held to a lawyer’s
standards concerning terminology and conclusions.33 If a buyer notifies
a seller about a problem from which the seller can reasonably infer that
it has not fulfilled all of its contractual obligations, the buyer should not
additionally have to articulate the legal conclusion that the seller is in
breach.34 The seller is perfectly capable of inquiring into the cause of
the buyer’s dissatisfaction,35 and imposing a complete forfeiture on the
buyer for failing to communicate fully its level of concern is a grossly
disproportionate response. A focus on the prejudice caused to the seller
by the language chosen by the buyer supports application of the lenient
test. If a seller acting reasonably interprets a buyer’s language as
indicating that it does not intend to pursue the matter further and the
seller suffers prejudice, as by delaying an investigation until evidence of
the cause of the problem is no longer available, a court would be
justified in denying the buyer a remedy.
The seller’s investigation interest cannot justify the notification
requirement in certain circumstances. For example, several courts have

32. The comments clearly debunk the more extreme approach taken by a few courts.
U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (2002) states, “Nor is there reason for requiring the notification to
be a claim for damages or of any threatened litigation or other resort to a remedy.” But
see Brookings Mun. Util., Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Co., 2000 DSD 28 ¶ 20, 103 F. Supp. 2d
1169, 1177 (holding that a buyer must warn a seller that it will face a claim for
damages); Cotner v. Int’l Harvester Co., 545 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Ark. 1977) (“[The buyer]
must, either directly or inferentially, inform the seller that the buyer demands damages
upon an asserted claim of breach of warranty.”).
33. But cf. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) (2002). Most courts recognize that an admission
for purposes of an exception to the statute of frauds does not require an admission that a
contract had been concluded but rather an admission only of facts from which the legal
conclusion can be drawn. See, e.g., Guy v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.,
58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 700, 704 (D.N.H. 2005).
34. But see Thomas G. Faria Corp. v. DaMa Jewelry Tech., Inc., 31 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (CBC) 115, 126 (D.R.I. 1996) (concluding that the buyer’s return over a threeyear period of a substantial quantity of defective goods did not indicate that it considered
the seller to be in breach); S. Ill. Stone Co. v. Universal Eng’g, 592 F.2d 446, 452 (8th
Cir. 1979) (“It is not enough that the seller be given notice of the mere facts constituting
a nonconforming tender; he must also be informed that the buyer considers him to be in
breach of the contract.”).
35. The buyer’s duty of good faith in enforcing the contract would obligate it to
give an appropriate response to such an inquiry, especially in light of U.C.C. § 2-515(a)
(2002), which provides that “[i]n furtherance of the adjustment of any claim or dispute
(a) either party on reasonable notification to the other and for the purpose of ascertaining
the facts and preserving evidence has the right to inspect, test and sample the goods
including such of them as may be in the possession or control of the other.”
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held that a buyer must notify a seller about a late delivery.36 Because the
seller must know that it delivered late, little, if anything, could be gained
by an investigation. In these and similar cases,37 there is a strong
statutory argument that the notification function is satisfied by the
seller’s knowledge,38 and a court that requires an affirmative notification
should address the interest to be served. In the ensuing section, the
discussion of whether the commencement of litigation constitutes
sufficient notification on settlement is relevant to this issue.
2. Settlement
A commonly stated advantage of notification is that it might lead to an
exploration of settlement between the parties.39 The comments indicate
that a notification is sufficient if it “opens the way for normal settlement
through negotiation.”40 Even if this is a legitimate policy rationale for
the notification requirement, some courts have pushed it too far. For
example, the court in T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour41
indicated that a buyer needs to encourage settlement in its notification.
There is no support for this proposition in the Code, and imposing a
burden on the buyer to encourage settlement through its notification
36. See, e.g., Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 152 (6th Cir.
1983); E. Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 971–73 (5th Cir. 1976).
Contra Jay V. Zimmerman Co. v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 1198, 1202–03 (E.D.
Mo. 1971). “The majority view, by an overwhelming margin, is that the notice rule
applies to claims for late delivery.” Reitz, supra note 20, at 544 n.32.
37. See In re Ford Motor Co. E-350 Van Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 66 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 726, 731–42 (D.N.J. 2008) (surveying the law of several states
regarding issue of whether actual notice, as opposed to knowledge, constitutes sufficient
notification); Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox Co., 581 F. Supp. 1514, 1530–32 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (denying remedies under the notification rule even though the seller knew when it
delivered the goods that it had used the wrong component).
38. “A person ‘notifies’ or ‘gives’ a notice or notification to another person by
taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other person in ordinary
course, whether or not the other person actually comes to know of it.” U.C.C.
§ 1-202(d) (2008) (emphasis added). “[A] person has ‘notice’ of a fact if the person: (1)
has actual knowledge of it; (2) has received a notice or notification of it; or (3) from all
the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time in question, has reason to
know that it exists.” Id. § 1-202(a) (emphasis added).
39. For an assessment by one commentator that the prospects for settlement should
be abandoned as a policy for the notification rule, see Reitz, supra note 20, at 550–52.
40. U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (2002); see also Clark, supra note 21, at 110; Phillips,
supra note 21, at 468–69; Prince, supra note 21, at 116; Chavis, supra note 21, at 524;
Hammond, supra note 21, at 541; Milberger, supra note 21, at 736–37.
41. 629 F.2d 338, 360–61 (5th Cir. 1980).
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could have the undesired effect of prompting a premature settlement
before the buyer has secured any legal advice and learned of the
potential waiver consequences concerning other possible claims.
To the extent that the settlement interest standing alone and not in
conjunction with another interest—such as the investigation interest,
which as we have seen can inform the seller with respect to settlement42—
supports a notification requirement, timeliness should be measured in
relation to the time at which a lawsuit is filed. In other words, a
notification is provided within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the breach if it arrives a sufficient
amount of time ahead of the suit to permit normal negotiations to occur.
Only by adopting this approach can a court measure a notification’s
prejudicial effect.
One of this Article’s Authors would go further and argue that the
filing of a lawsuit generally constitutes a notification that properly
accommodates the seller’s settlement interest because the filing does not
preempt opportunities for settlement.43 This Author notes that the cases
that have touted the seller’s settlement interest have not focused on the
actual prejudicial impact of a notification failure but rather have referred
simply to the alleged benefits of notification in the abstract. Professionals
disagree among themselves on the psychological aspects of settlement,
including whether the commencement of litigation promotes or hinders
the likelihood of settlement.44 Given the uncertainty, this Author
concludes that precluding the buyer from all remedies is simply too
harsh and that the question should be whether the failure to provide
prelitigation notification caused an actual loss or diminishment of the
seller’s settlement opportunities. For example, a seller that would have
settled for all of the buyer’s damages but hired an attorney only because
the buyer first commenced litigation would be prejudiced if it incurred
42. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
43. For example, in Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983), the
court stated that:
The filing of a complaint is certainly not a bar to the negotiation and settlement
of claims. To the contrary, the prospect of going to trial is often a powerful incentive
to a defendant to investigate the claims against it and to arrive at a reasonable
agreement. A defendant may more easily and effectively prepare for either settlement
or trial when it may compel discovery and so determine for itself the basis for
a plaintiff’s claims of liability.
Id. at 462–63; see also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 155
F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1109–11 (S.D. Ind. 2001); Solarz v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 47 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 970, 980–82 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2002) (holding that filing a complaint
constituted notification of a breach of warranty claim).
44. Two authors refer to studies by psychologists and game theorists that hold differing
assessments of the issue and note the numerous relevant variables. Reitz, supra note 20,
at 551 nn.49–50; Hammond, supra note 21, at 546–47 nn.122–25.
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substantial legal fees that it could have avoided with a prelitigation
notice.45
This Article’s other Author disagrees and would not permit a lawsuit
to satisfy the notification requirement.46 A competent buyer’s attorney,
concerned about possible prejudice, should send the seller a notification
as soon as possible. Indeed, prudence will generally dictate that
notification be provided even before the attorney is satisfied that filing
suit is consistent with the obligations imposed by Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and its state counterparts. A notification from
an attorney, in itself, conveys a seriousness of purpose and it is difficult
to see how the immediate filing of a lawsuit would increase the
prospects for settlement. Although the psychology of the situation is
admittedly vague, the Author advocating notification is of the opinion
that filing in some cases may impede settlement by causing the seller to
incur attorney’s fees, by causing the cost of settling to increase—even if
only in the seller’s perception—and by precipitating in the seller a
negative emotional response. Because providing notification is prudent
anyway and because the prejudice to the seller of not doing so may be
real yet hard to prove and measure, this Author would conclusively
presume that the seller has been prejudiced if the buyer files a lawsuit
without first providing notification.

45. Courts, however, should reject arguments based solely on abstract impairment.
The claim for litigation expenses would not be justified if legal counsel defended the
seller in the litigation without making a bona fide effort to settle. Cf. Fitl v. Strek, 690
N.W.2d 605, 608–09 (Neb. 2005) (holding that a seller could not base a claim of
prejudice on impairment of negotiations because the seller never sought to negotiate).
46. See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507,
510–13 (Alaska 1980); Fleet Maint., Inc. v. Burke Energy Midwest Corp., 728 P.2d 408,
410 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986). Some courts have differentiated between claims for economic
loss and claims for personal injury and have held that filing a lawsuit is insufficient
notification only in the former cases. See, e.g., Martin v. Home Depot U.S.A., 369
F. Supp. 2d 887, 893 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that a consumer buyer’s failure to give
prelitigation notification barred claims for economic damages allegedly caused by breach
of the express and implied warranties); Hobbs v. Gen. Motors Corp., 134 F. Supp. 2d
1277, 1284–85 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (holding that filing a lawsuit is insufficient notification
when making a claim for economic damages as opposed to a claim for personal injury);
Perona v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 890 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995) (holding that filing a lawsuit is insufficient to meet the notice requirement unless
personal injury is claimed), vacated, 678 N.E.2d 1048 (Ill. 1997). Although eliminating
the notification requirement in cases of personal injury is understandable, the courts that
have done so may not have fully considered the availability of strict products liability in
tort as an alternative basis for imposing liability.
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Even accepting settlement as an appropriate policy rationale, an
approach that measures timeliness against the buyer’s discovery of the
breach or that requires more by way of sufficiency than a simple
statement that a problem exists runs counter to the settlement objective.
Section 2-607(3)(a) creates an incentive for sellers to challenge the
timeliness and sufficiency of a buyer’s notification by excessively
rewarding success in pursuing that strategy—a classic case of moral
hazard. If the seller’s challenge succeeds, it bars the buyer from any
remedy irrespective of the significance of the seller’s breach.47 Sellers
likely would be more open to negotiated settlements, and the settlement
amounts likely would be fairer, if the courts focused on the actual
prejudice to the seller in dealing with the notification issue.
3. Good Faith
Good faith is yet another policy rationale that has been advanced in
support of the notification requirement.48 The comments even state that
“the rule of requiring notification is designed to defeat commercial bad
faith.”49 Notification is but one facet of the Code’s pervasive mandate
that good faith be observed in the performance and enforcement of every
contract or duty within its scope.50 It defines “good faith” to mean
“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing.”51
Although good faith indisputably applies to notification, it does not
appear to have any specific content in that context. Most cases do not
address good faith beyond citing the reference to it in the comments.
The cases and commentators that go further have not developed much
meaning as to what good faith requires in terms of the key issues of
timeliness and sufficiency. One of the few cases to analyze the issue
with care, and the case that several subsequent decisions purport to

47. See Armco Steel Corp., 611 P.2d at 512 (“[W]e believe the superior court erred
in finding that the lack of prejudice to the seller excused [the buyer’s] absolute failure to
give notice.”).
48. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 418; Goetz et al., supra note 21, at
1317–18; Phillips, supra note 21, at 469; Hammond, supra note 21, at 540; Milberger,
supra note 21, at 749.
49. U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (2002).
50. Id. § 1-304 (2008).
51. Id. § 1-201(b)(20). In states that have not yet adopted revised Article 1 or have
adopted it but retained the original definition of good faith, good faith means different
things for merchants and nonmerchants. For nonmerchants it means “honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned.” Id. § 1-201(19) (2000). For merchants it means
“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
in the trade.” Id. § 2-103(1)(b) (2002).
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follow, is Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.52 The case
concerned significant delivery delays under a series of contracts for
ninety jets. The jets were scheduled for delivery over a four-year period
at a time when the demands of the Vietnam War were affecting aircraft
production. The district court, relying on a single letter, concluded that
Eastern had given proper notification and granted it summary judgment.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed because of the district
court’s “failure to recognize that the buyer’s good faith is the governing
criteria under section 2-607.”53 The appellate court noted that, particularly
in an ongoing relationship, the buyer’s conduct “taken as a whole, must
constitute timely notification that the transaction is claimed to involve a
breach.”54 In furtherance of its contextual analysis, the court detailed the
multiple communications between the parties from the time they both
became aware of scheduling shortfalls beginning in early 1966, until
Eastern formally presented McDonnell Douglas with a claim for
damages in mid-1969. Giving McDonnell Douglas the required benefit
of every inference, the court identified how a jury might reasonably
conclude that the notification was insufficient. First, even Eastern’s
most strongly worded communications could be construed more as an
effort to push McDonnell Douglas into minimizing the war’s impact on
production rather than as an assertion of breach. Second, Eastern perhaps
led McDonnell Douglas to believe that it had not breached for two
reasons: (1) it did not contest the assertion that the war had caused the
delays until it filed suit; and (2) it continued to negotiate new contracts
and amend existing ones with McDonnell Douglas throughout the
delays.55 Finally, although contested by Eastern, McDonnell Douglas
testified that Eastern gave assurances it would not seek damages for
delays. Based on all the facts and particularly taking into consideration
the alleged assurances that Eastern would not seek damages, the court
concluded that “Eastern’s conduct may well have violated the requirements
of commercial good faith,”56 and it remanded the issue for determination
by a jury.57 In its ruling, the court noted that the district court’s record
52. 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
53. Id. at 977.
54. Id. at 978.
55. Id. at 978–79.
56. Id. at 979.
57. In a subsequent decision, the Fifth Circuit, in affirming a district court decision
in favor of a buyer, noted that Eastern Air Lines had been tried to the court rather than
being decided on a motion for summary judgment. See T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193
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was devoid of any evidence concerning reasonable standards of fair
dealing in the commercial aviation industry.
Subsequent decisions often draw upon Eastern Air Lines, but
unfortunately, they do not exercise the same care in analysis. K & M
Joint Venture v. Smith International, Inc.58 is illustrative. The buyer of a
tunnel-boring machine experienced multiple serious malfunctions from
the beginning of a sewer construction project until the time the buyer
finally removed the machine from the project and had it rebuilt
completely. The buyer notified the seller repeatedly about the problems,
had the seller inspect the machine, and indicated fairly early in the
process that it would hold the seller responsible for the breakdowns.
Allegedly applying the lessons of Eastern Air Lines, the majority in
K & M concluded that the buyer’s notification was neither timely nor
sufficient because it did not specifically state that the seller had breached
a warranty until it filed suit and because its course of conduct in paying
the seller for replacement parts without protest was inconsistent with its
earlier claim of seller responsibility. The majority thus read the determination
in Eastern Air Lines that the buyer’s continued contracting with the seller
might constitute bad faith into a finding that such conduct constitutes
bad faith. The dissent was much more perceptive, pointing out the need
to take into consideration the buyer’s reliance on the seller for parts and
technical assistance with respect to a machine that was critical to its
project and was not readily replaceable.59 An overly strident position by
the buyer might have adversely affected its prospects for meeting its
contractual deadline on the sewer project.
Another tendency of courts that address good faith in the context of a
buyer’s notification is to equate good faith with other policies that
purportedly underlie section 2-607(3)(a). The Fifth Circuit itself noted
Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 364 (5th Cir. 1980). The court determined that the record
supported the finding that the buyer’s conduct had the effect of encouraging commercial
good faith because the buyer had provided prompt notification about an insect infestation
in delivered flour and had never deviated from its position that the tender was unacceptable.
58. 669 F.2d 1106 (6th Cir. 1982).
59. See also P & F Construction Corp. v. Friend Lumber Corp. of Medford, 575
N.E.2d 61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991), in which the court, without any evidence concerning
commercial practices with respect to measuring goods delivered to construction sites,
concluded that the buyer should have discovered quarter-inch defects in delivered doors
and notified the seller shortly after delivery, notwithstanding the fact that the doors had
been delivered early and were a nuisance to have on the construction site. The court in
Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), did
much better with industry practices when determining that the frequent complaints of the
buyer, a coal broker, concerning the quality of the coal being delivered under ongoing
contracts did not constitute adequate notification. The court noted evidence showing
that coal brokers routinely complain about quality in the coal industry, and also showing
that the broker’s claims were undercut by its even more frequent praise of the seller’s
coal and repeated orders during the period when it was making its complaints.
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this tendency in a decision subsequent to Eastern Air Lines.60 The court
observed that although other courts endorse the Eastern Air Lines
analysis, they often define good faith in terms of such policies as
investigation, settlement, cure, mitigation, and staleness.61 In other
words, these courts have stripped good faith of any meaning that is
independent of the other policies.
The case law demonstrates that, in this context, the courts have not
refined the concept of good faith much beyond recognizing that an
assessment of good faith is highly dependent on the commercial context,
the nature of the parties’ contractual relationship, and the totality of their
communications. The communications to be examined include those of
both the seller and the buyer, and courts should be cognizant of the fact
that the obligation of good faith applies equally to both parties.62 Rather
than using good faith as a surrogate for other policies or the lack of good
faith as a freestanding basis for barring the buyer from all remedies, it
makes more sense to use good faith as an analytic tool under a prejudicebased approach. If a court finds that a buyer has significantly prejudiced
its seller’s interests by a notification that is untimely or insufficient when
considered in the context of their relationship, in light of all their
communications, and in light of the standards of honesty in fact and
conformity with reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, then it
is justified in barring the buyer from any remedy. As in other instances,
amended section 2-607(3)(a) would provide additional flexibility by
permitting courts to bar remedies only to the extent of the prejudice.

60. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 629 F.2d at 359–60.
61. Id. at 361 n.49 (criticizing the analysis in Standard Alliance Industries v. Black
Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 826 (6th Cir. 1978)); see also Besicorp Group, Inc. v.
Thermo Electron Corp., 981 F. Supp. 86, 101 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing the comment on
good faith and indicating that “[t]he primary reason for requiring notice is to give the
seller the opportunity to make adjustments or replacements, opportunities to minimize
the buyer’s loss and reduce the seller’s own liability”).
62. Only a few courts have addressed a seller’s good faith obligations in this
context. See, e.g., N. States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 410 (8th Cir.
1985) (holding that notice was sufficient when a seller insisted that it had no
responsibility and did not inform buyer of its internal concerns over liability, despite
receiving from the buyer notification of the product’s catastrophic failure and a copy of a
consultant’s report blaming the failure on defective design); T.J. Stevenson & Co., 629
F.2d at 364 (finding that the seller acted much less reasonably than the buyer and noting
in particular how the seller’s quick denial of insect infestation in its flour suggested a
lack of investigation).
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B. Noncompelling Policies
1. Cure
Giving a seller an opportunity to cure is one of the most common
rationales advanced for the notification requirement.63 The rationale is
curious because sellers do not have a statutory right to cure in the
context of section 2-607(3)(a)64 and a seller cannot bootstrap its way into
additional cure rights through the notification responsibilities allocated
to the buyer.
Even though Article 2 does not create applicable cure rights, a buyer
and seller can agree that the seller may cure a defect at any time.65 They
can make the agreement in the original contract66 or through a subsequent
modification. In the context of section 2-607(3)(a), the agreement will
be part of the settlement process. The seller’s interest in avoiding
further liability through cure is thus largely subsumed by the settlement
rationale, and perhaps also the investigation rationale. If the seller is the
least-cost cure provider, the mitigation rationale might also be
implicated, although that rationale is generally not compelling. Other

63. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20; Clark, supra note 21, at 111;
Goetz et al., supra note 21, at 1318; Prince, supra note 21; Chavis, supra note 21;
Hammond, supra note 21; Milberger, supra note 21, at 749; Arlie R. Nogay, Comment,
Enforcing the Rights of Remote Sellers Under the UCC: Warranty Disclaimers, the
Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose and the Notice Requirement in the
Nonprivity Context, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 873, 899 (1986); see also Standard Alliance
Indus., 587 F.2d at 826; Hoffman’s Double Bar Pine Nursery v. Fyke, 663 P.2d 516, 518
(Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., 319 N.W.2d 855, 862 (Wis.
1982).
64. The key provision on cure is U.C.C. § 2-508 (2002), which by its terms applies
only to cases of rejection. Section 2-612(2) refers to cure as it relates to an installment of
goods, but again the context is rejection. Section 2-607(3)(a) applies only if the goods
have been accepted, and acceptance precludes rejection. A few courts have applied
section 2-508(2) cure rights following revocation of acceptance. See supra note 7 and
sources cited therein. An implicit prerevocation cure right applies under section
2-608(1)(a) if the buyer discovers a nonconformity in the goods but nevertheless accepts
them on the reasonable assumption that the noncomformity will be cured. A failure of
notification under section 2-607(3)(a) can hardly ever impair this implicit right to cure
because the buyer’s obligation of good faith will preclude it from revoking based on an
uncured problem if the buyer has not notified the seller of the need for a cure. For a
discussion of cure, see generally William H. Lawrence, Cure in Contracts for the Sales
of Goods: Looking Beyond Section 2-508, 21 UCC L.J. 333 (1989).
65. See U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a) (2002).
66. The predominant consensual cure agreement is the “repair or replace” clause,
which if agreed to be exclusive becomes the buyer’s sole remedy. Id. § 2-719(1)(a).
Such a clause creates a cure right, but the buyer’s other remedies are restored if the
clause fails its essential purpose, such as if the seller either cannot or will not provide a
timely cure. Id. § 2-719(2). A buyer’s duty of good faith precludes it from attempting to
force a failure of essential purpose by withholding notification of a problem, and by
providing notification, it satisfies the requirements of section 2-607(3)(a).

590

HENNING LAWRENCE FINAL ARTICLE (2) FINAL ARTICLE

10/2/2009 10:51 AM

A Unified Rationale

[VOL. 46: 573, 2009]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

than these specific contexts, which are discussed elsewhere in this
Article,67 there is no basis for advancing cure as a policy basis supporting
the notification requirement.
2. Mitigation
Another rationale for the notification requirement that courts
sometimes rely upon is mitigation of damages.68 The idea is that timely
and sufficient notification permits a seller to take reasonable steps to
minimize the harm suffered by the buyer and thereby to minimize its
exposure to damages. However, in most cases, notification will be
irrelevant for this purpose, and in any event, the consequences of a
buyer’s failure to mitigate the harm is built into the Article 2 remedy
provisions themselves.69 Holding that a buyer failed to give proper
notice on the basis of the mitigation rationale means that the buyer is
precluded from all remedies even though the court could have simply
limited the damages to those that the buyer could not have reasonably
avoided.
The most obvious Code provision on mitigation—because it is the
only explicit statement—is the limitation of a buyer’s consequential
damages to losses, “which could not reasonably be prevented by cover
or otherwise.”70 Thus, an aggrieved buyer cannot enhance its recovery
of lost profits by delaying its notification to the seller after discovering
that defective goods will have a negative impact on production.71 Aside
67. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the settlement rationale); Part II.A.1 (discussing the
investigation rationale); infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the mitigation rationale).
68. See, e.g, E. Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 972 (5th
Cir. 1976) (stating that early notification allows a seller to minimize damages); Voboril
v. Namco Leisure World, Inc., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 614, 615 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1978) (stating that delayed notification prevents a seller from minimizing damages).
69. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2002).
70. Id. See, for example, Dan J. Sheehan Co. v. Ceramic Technics, Ltd., 605
S.E.2d 375 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), in which the buyer did not notify the seller that the tiles
supplied were the incorrect size until four months after their receipt and installation. The
court relied on the mitigation principle in denying the buyer a remedy because of the late
notification. However, under section 2-715(2)(a), the buyer would have been precluded
from recovering any avoidable consequential damages related to removal of the tile and
reinstallation of the correct size. Mitigation would not have justified denial of damages
calculated under section 2-714, meaning in this case that the difference in value between
the tile if it had been as warranted and the tile as delivered.
71. Notification is also generally irrelevant with respect to consequential damages
in the form of personal injury or property loss, which cannot be recovered unless they are
proximately caused by a breach of warranty. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (2002). See, e.g.,
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from incidental damages,72 the other damages provision applicable to
accepted goods is section 2-714(2), which measures damages for breach
of warranty by the difference between the value of the goods if they had
been as warranted and their actual value at the time and place of
acceptance. In other words, the damages are calculated at a time before
the buyer could possibly notify the seller, making delay in notification
irrelevant to mitigation.
In a limited number of circumstances, timely notification to a seller
might lead to a reduction in the harm suffered by the buyer. For
example, even though a seller does not have a statutory right to cure in
the context of section 2-607(3)(a), it might nevertheless be able to cure
at the least cost to the buyer. Courts, however, have been reluctant to
require a buyer to deal further with a breaching seller.73 A seller might
also be able to advise the buyer of a third party that can make repairs
cheaply, or it might be able to instruct the buyer on a technique that will
keep the goods functioning pending repair. It might even be able to
warn the buyer of an impending threat of personal injury or property
damage that the buyer otherwise would not have perceived.74 Nevertheless,
given that the chance that notification will result in mitigation is quite
small and that courts routinely apply mitigation principles to preclude
buyers from recovering damages that they could have avoided,
mitigation does not provide a meaningful rationale for the notification
requirement.
Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex, 779 F. Supp. 1519, 1541 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (holding that a
buyer escalated the costs of mitigation by not taking precautions against contamination
or requiring seller to do so), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993); WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Wheeler, 586 S.E.2d 83, 84, 86–87 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that
a seller could not have reduced the damages after an injury occurred in a case in which a
purchased bow release detached from the bow and struck the buyer in the mouth).
72. Incidental damages arise most often in cases of nondelivery or rejection,
whereas U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (2002) deals only with accepted goods. In cases of acceptance,
buyers usually incur incidental damages—the cost of inspection, for example—before
they discover or should have discovered the breach, and in any event, recovery is limited
by a reasonableness requirement. Id. § 2-715(1).
73. For excellent discussions that argue for limited application of mitigation principles
in this context, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Towards a
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 992–93, 1005–11 (1983);
Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach—Common Law
Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L.
REV. 553, 586 (1976).
74. See, for example, Hapag-Lloyd, A.G. v. Marine Indemnity Insurance Co. of
America, 576 So.2d 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), in which the buyer discovered a
wiring problem in a machine but continued to use it for an additional four weeks, at
which time it exploded. The court denied recovery because notification to the seller after the
explosion was too late. If the notification had occurred earlier, the seller could have
warned the buyer of the danger. The same result could have been reached by finding
that the harm was not the proximate result of the breach.
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3. Staleness
Another purported rationale for requiring notification is the prevention
of stale claims.75 In addition to its relationship to the objective of giving
the seller an opportunity to assess the facts while the evidence is fresh,
which is subsumed by the investigation rationale, this rationale is tied to
the principle of finality. Some courts and commentators refer to the
objective of repose—allowing a seller that has not been informed of a
breach for some time to close the books on the transaction without
concern that it might later have to face a claim of liability.76
Preventing stale claims is the function of the statute of limitations and
it is a mistake to inject it into the discussion of section 2-607(3)(a).
Article 2 claims must be brought within four years of the date of
accrual,77 which in the case of warranties is ordinarily the date on which
tender of delivery occurs.78 If a seller is concerned about staleness, it
can bargain for a shorter limitations period.79 Using a buyer’s failure of
notification to cut off its rights before the limitations period runs
effectively rewrites the statute of limitations.
In any event, the notification requirement cannot satisfy the objective
of providing repose. Under section 2-607(3)(a), a buyer of goods does
not have to provide notification until it discovers or should have
discovered the breach, and until the limitations period runs, there is
always the possibility that a latent defect will manifest itself. If the
limitations period has not run, a seller cannot close its books on a
transaction and achieve peace of mind merely because it has not yet
heard about a problem.

75. See Brookings Mun. Util., Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Co., 2000 DSD 28 ¶ 17, 103
F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1176; Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 525 P.2d 88, 92 (Cal. 1974);
Clark, supra note 21, at 111; Prince, supra note 21, at 115; Hammond, supra note 21.
76. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 418–19 (referring to repose in this
context as “mind balm”); Prince, supra note 21, at 115.
77. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (2002).
78. Id. § 2-725(2). The cause of action for a warranty that explicitly extends to the
future performance of the goods accrues when the buyer discovers or should have
discovered the breach. Id.
79. The parties may in their original agreement reduce the limitations period to not
less than one year. Id. § 2-725(1).

593

HENNING LAWRENCE FINAL ARTICLE (2) FINAL ARTICLE

10/2/2009 10:51 AM

III. CONCLUSION
The Authors have sought to demonstrate in this Article that the current
section 2-607(3)(a) does not provide sufficient guidance to the courts
and that many of the rationales routinely advanced in support of the
notification requirement are inapt. Court decisions applying the section
reveal a level of inconsistency that borders on, and perhaps crosses into,
incoherence. Much is at stake here, and a court should not lightly deprive a
buyer of the benefit of its bargain. As noted above, many courts that
have precluded buyers from pursuing remedies have buttressed their
conclusions by noting that a particular delay has prejudiced a seller’s
rights, and these courts are worthy of praise.80 However, the Authors’
preference is the approach of those courts that have made the search for
prejudice the central focus of their analysis.81 The Authors are especially
critical of those courts that have decided that, as a matter of law, the
passage of what seems like a long period of time constitutes an unreasonable
delay without any reference to the effect of the delay on the seller.82 The
only rationale that could possibly justify such a result is the prevention
of stale claims, and as many have shown, achieving that goal is exclusively
the province of the statute of limitations.83
Although an enactment of the amended section 2-607(3)(a) is preferable
because of the flexibility provided by its “to the extent” language, this
may not occur anytime soon. Courts nevertheless should not be deterred
as they are free to adopt a prejudice-based approach. This is an
encouraging solution, thereby providing buyers and sellers with greater
certainty and achieving fairer results.

80. See supra Part II.A.1–2.
81. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wheeler, 586 S.E.2d 83, 86 (Ga. Ct. App.
2003) (holding that a consumer’s twenty-four month delay in providing notification did
not preclude remedies absent showing of prejudice by seller).
82. See, e.g., Joseph Brazier, Ltd. v. Specialty Bar Prods. Co., No. 06-cv-01416WDM-KLM, 2008 WL 791942, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 21, 2008) (holding an eight-month
delay in providing notification that acceptance of blank steel shotgun barrels was revoked to
be unreasonable as a matter of law); Bako v. Crystal Cabinet Works, Inc., 44 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (CBC) 1048, 1054 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (deciding that homeowners who failed to
notify stain supplier of warranty breach for almost seven months precluded from all remedies).
83. See supra Part II.B.3.
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